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Abstract
We explore how the multi-dimensional aspects of information released by the FOMC
has effects on both market and real economic variables. Using tools from computa-
tional linguistics, we measure the information released by the FOMC on the state
of economic conditions, as well as the guidance the FOMC provides about future
monetary policy decisions. Employing these measures within a FAVAR framework,
we find that shocks to forward guidance are more important than the FOMC com-
munication of current economic conditions in terms of their effects on market and
real variables. Nonetheless, neither communication has particularly strong effects
on real economic variables.
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1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that many aspects of modern monetary policy aim to manage
inflation expectations (King, Lu, and Paste´n 2008). This is because economic agents
forward-looking decisions typically depend on expected real interest rates over reasonably
long horizons (up to, and beyond, 20 years for major investment decisions). Given that
the central bank controls nominal interest rates only at very short maturities, private
sector economic agents must take a view on both the likely future developments in the
economy, as well as the reaction of the central bank to these developments, in order to
establish their expectations of longer-term real interest rates.
Central bank communication has emerged as a key tool for central banks in their at-
tempts to control inflation expectations. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
first accompanied their decision with a statement in February 1994 and although state-
ments were ad-hoc for most of the 1990s, they are now a regular and closely-monitored
FOMC release. Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Haan, and Jansen (2008), in their survey
of the large literature that has developed examining different aspects of communication
by monetary authorities, define central bank communication broadly as the information
that the central bank makes available about its current and future policy objectives, the
current economic outlook, and the likely path for future monetary policy decisions. An
important and open area in monetary policy is how to design central banks to optimise
their policy outcomes (Reis 2013), and the question of optimal communication strategy
is central to this discussion.
Before we can study optimal communication by central banks, we need to understand
the effects of different strategies on a variety of macroeconomic and market variables. The
novel empirical approach taken in this paper is to use techniques from computational lin-
guistics, applied to the statements of the FOMC, to measure the extent to which the
information provided is about the current outlook for the economy, and to what extent
it provides a guide for the future. This allows us to focus on multi-dimensional monetary
policy and we can contribute answers to two major questions in the literature. First, we
use our extracted measures of communication as variables in a Factor-Augmented VAR
(FAVAR, due to Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005), Stock and Watson (2005) and Mar-
cellino, Favero, and Neglia (2005)) to examine the effect of central bank communication
on macroeconomic and financial variables. Second, we examine which specific dimensions
of monetary policy communication drive these effects.
To be more precise on the dimensions of monetary policy that we have in mind,
consider a central bank that, on average, makes decisions that are well-described by a
rule for nominal interest rates in the spirit of Taylor (1993):
it = φ× Γt + t (1)
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where φ is the vector of reaction coefficients, Γt is the vector of economic inputs to the
rule and t is the deviation from that rule at time t. Agents can use their knowledge of
this rule, together with expectations of the inputs to the decision, in order to form their
beliefs on future decisions and future interest rates.
When the central bank announces its decision at time t, it reveals it. It is the behaviour
of this interest rate variable that attracts most attention in the analysis of the effects of
monetary policy. We consider that the central bank can also communicate through its
statement, and we consider that this communication adds two additional dimensions to
monetary policy. Since we will empirically measure these two aspects that the central
bank can communicate about, we will be in a unique position to study the dynamic effects
of central bank communication. The two additional dimensions of monetary policy that
we consider are communication about:
State of Economy: the FOMC’s belief about the current and expected economic out-
look Γt.
Forward Guidance: the FOMC’s expected deviations from this average rule (t), or a
commitment to follow some path that may deviate from the average rule.
Our main finding in this paper is that, at least in the US in the last 18 years, central
bank communication on future interest rates (forward guidance) seems to have been much
more important than their communication of current economic conditions. However, we
find that neither communication has particularly strong effects on real economic variables
in our FAVAR, especially relative to the effect of the actual policy stance.
Of course, issues of central bank communication have been studied before in both
theoretical models (for example, the model-based evaluation of central bank communi-
cation strategies in Eusepi and Preston (2010)), and there is also an emerging empirical
literature. For example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) examine the communication
strategies of the ECB, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve; Ranaldo and Rossi
(2010) examines the financial market effects of Swiss National Bank announcements;
Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010) considers the predictability of future Fed rates using infor-
mation in announcements; Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2011) looks at the ECB
and media reaction; and Hayo, Kutan, and Neuenkirch (2012) focuses on asset market
reactions to Fed communications.
A key motivating paper for this literature is Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)
(GSS). They show, using an event study approach analysing movements in financial
markets data around FOMC interest rate decisions, that central bank announcements
move markets.1 In fact, the statement accounts for most of the movements in 5- and
1Specifically, they decompose the effects of FOMC announcements on financial markets into different
factors and reject that a single factor related to the policy actions sufficiently explains the movements.
Instead, they identify two factors in their analysis of FOMC statements from 1990 to 2004.
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10-year Treasury yields. They conclude that expectations of future decisions are key and
that the statements are what help to affect investor expectations.2
While GSS is an important paper which indicates that central bank communication
reveals information to investors and thereby influences their expectations, a downside of
their methodology is that they do not measure the communication. Instead, the effects
of policy, and their identified ‘path factor’ is revealed from the immediate response of
particular asset prices. Though they find that “FOMC actions were priced into the fed-
eral funds futures market almost immediately”, the detail and complexity of the FOMC
statement has increased substantially since the financial crisis and especially since the de-
ployment of unconventional monetary policy (Herna´ndez-Murillo and Shell 2014).3 This
means that if the full understanding and reaction took longer (days), and the imme-
diate response was only transitory, we might get a very misleading view of the effects
of the statements from this methodology. A second downside is that we do not learn
what information is being revealed to investors (Woodford 2012). Given that we measure
two specific aspects of the central bank communication directly, we can use these mea-
sures to assess the importance of each dimension. As such, we view our work as highly
complementary to the GSS event-study methodology.
The major empirical challenge for the analysis of central bank communication, and
one we address head on in this paper, is to convert the raw communication, which is
typically words, into meaningful quantities which we can systematically analyse. Some
approaches simply only focus on quantitative communication (such as released central
bank forecasts), while others use counts of some pre-selected keywords (as in Rosa and
Verga (2008)) to measure content. The main methodological contribution in this paper
is to use computational linguistics, and particularly the combination of topic modelling
and dictionary methods, in order to examine the content of what central banks are trying
to communicate to the markets and the public.
The first obvious advantage of the use of automated techniques rather than a purely
narrative approach to study the statements is scalability without concerns about con-
sistency of the application of the method. With automated methods it is then easy to
extend the sample to include more recent data, other sources of communication such as
FOMC speeches, or to extend it to other central banks. The second advantage is pre-
cisely that the researcher does not have to worry that too much prior knowledge of the
big announcements is allowed to determine the choices made in creating the indices. Of
course, narrative methods might be able to pick up some of the nuance of statements
2They write: “our results do not indicate that policy actions are secondary so much as that their
influence comes earlier when investors build in expectations of those actions in response to FOMC
statements (and perhaps other events, such as speeches and testimony by FOMC members).”
3This is measured by both the length of the statement, which increased from 50-200 words in the
early 1990s, to more than 800 words in the first five meetings of Janet Yellen as Chair. This is reflected
in the estimated Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level increasing from a range of 9-14 to 18-19.
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more precisely. We make use of both in this paper.
In terms of the computational approaches, we use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
and dictionary methods to extract the content of official interest rate communications
(statements) by the Federal Reserve. LDA is widely used in linguistics, computer sci-
ence, and other fields; the article that introduced it, Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003), has
over 10,000 citations in 10 years. While computational linguistic models are used in
the political science literature, their use is still mainly descriptive; for example, Quinn,
Monroe, Colaresi, Crespin, and Radev (2010) use a topic model similar to LDA to study
congressional speeches to see what congress is talking about. We believe that the ap-
proach of using computational linguistics to create measures of communication from large
databases of text has broader applications beyond monetary policy analysis and can help
bringing economics into the increasingly important world of “Big Data”. Existing work
using computational linguistics tools to analyse monetary policy data include Bailey and
Schonhardt-Bailey (2008) and Schonhardt-Bailey (2013) who focus on arguments and per-
suasive strategies adopted by policymakers; Fligstein, Brundage, and Schultz (2014) who
apply LDA to the FOMC transcripts in order to examine the concept of “sense-making”
on the FOMC; Acosta (2015) looks at how the FOMC responded to calls for greater
transparency; and our own recent work examining the effect of transparency on the de-
liberation of the FOMC using LDA applied to FOMC transcripts (Hansen, McMahon,
and Prat 2014).
Hendry and Madeley (2010) and Hendry (2012) are closely related papers focusing on
Canada. The objective of both papers is to understand how central bank communication
affects markets, and both use text-mining tools in this endeavour. As well as different
tools from text-mining, and applying them to a different country, the main difference
between our paper and these papers is that we look at a broader set of reactions, whereas
these papers focus on the response of returns and volatility in interest rate markets.
The closest paper in the literature is Lucca and Trebbi (2009). They also applied com-
putational linguistic tools to FOMC statements and measure the effects on the macroe-
conomy including in a VAR framework. The main contribution of our work relative to
their work is that we separately look at the effect of different dimensions of monetary
policy. We also apply different tools from computational linguitics (both LDA for topic
modelling and dictionary methods to measure tone). Finally, as a small difference, we ex-
amine the effects in a FAVAR which allows us to look at a wide variety of macroeconomic
effects, though our ordering variables is similar.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the idea behind
the effects of central bank communication and how we measure these three dimensions
empiricially. We then introduce the macroeconometric methodology (FAVAR) before
exploring the results and concluding.
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2 Dimension 1: Stance of current monetary policy
Before we turn to the measurement of communication, we begin by discussing the most
traditional dimension of monetary policy - the stance of current policy. Most studies
focus only on this single aspect of monetary policy. In the FAVAR model of Bernanke,
Boivin, and Eliasz (2005), as in VAR analyses in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1999) or Stock and Watson (2001), the effective Fed Funds rate (it), is included as a
driving variable affecting the economy.
However, as our analysis covers 1998 to 2014, this period is significantly affected by the
zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. This is problematic because economic
conditions may be pretty poor, but since the FOMC cannot change the Federal Funds
Target Rate once it hits the ZLB, the estimated reaction to economic conditions would
be less than is otherwise the case. Moreover, there is a period around September 2008
during which the FFR was cut very aggressively as a result of the failure of Lehman
Brothers and the ensuing financial markets disruption, but a relatively large recession
followed nonetheless. Finally, given the FOMC made significant use of large-scale asset
purchases as a part of a credit-easing policy, the concern is that using it as the measure
of monetary stance is not at all appropriate.
The solution we adopt is to use the shadow rate data from Wu and Xia (2014).4
Using a shadow rate term structure model, the authors derive a measure st to assess the
current stance of monetary policy at the ZLB. This shadow rate is given by the minimum
value between the effective Fed Funds Rate and the shadow rate. This means that the
monetary stance is measured by the effective Fed funds rate when interest rates are above
the ZLB, but can become negative at the ZLB. Figure 1 plots the measure of monetary
stance (st) that we use.
3 Dimension 2: Views about the economy
Given the lags in the availability of economic data, and the fact that monetary policy
decisions are made as forward looking decisions, the FOMC make decisions using an
information set that may differ from those of the public. As such, the second dimension
of monetary policy that the FOMC can provide information on is its beliefs about the
state of the economy.
We derive empirical measures using a novel approach to combine “the two Ts”: Topic
and Tone. That is, we need to know first whether the central bank is talking about the
state of the economy (Γt), the topic, and then we need to measure how they are talking
about it (tone). In this paper, we make use of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to
4There are other similar approaches to calculating a shadow rate including Bauer and Rudebusch
(2013) and Krippner (2013).
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Figure 1: Federal Reserve Monetary Stance: Shadow rate (Wu and Xia 2014)
Notes: This figure shows the current monetary stance of FOMC monetary policy measured
using the shadow rate model of (Wu and Xia 2014).
measure when they are talking about economic topic and a balance measure based on
dictionary methods, or word counting, to measure tone. Our proposed way of combining
these two approaches allows us to measure topic-level tone which helps to deal, some-
what, with the weakness of dictionary methods. That is, rather than just measure words
associated with expansion, we can measure expansion words associated with GDP growth
rather than risk premia. We now discuss in more detail our empirical strategy to measure
the FOMC statements on the state of the economy.
3.1 Measuring Economic Topics using LDA
LDA is a very popular algorithm developed by Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003) and used for
information retrival. Here we use it to discover the topic of each sentence of the FOMC
statements. In this subsection we outline the basic steps and intuition for the algorithm.
Hansen, McMahon, and Prat (2014) provide a full description along with the statistical
foundations.5
LDA is essentially a very fleixble clustering algorithm for words that groups words
into topics on the basis of repeated co-occurrence across paragraphs. There are two
inputs to the algorithm. The first input that the user must supply is a corpus of the
documents of text to be analysed; in this paper the corpus is the full history of FOMC
statements accompanying decisions on monetary policy where we group words at the
level of an individual paragraph in a statement. However, before using the words in the
5Blei and Lafferty (2009) contains an overview of LDA and some of its extensions.
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LDA analysis, we first remove stop words (such as ‘the’, ‘a’ and ‘and’) and also stem
the remaining words which reduces them to a common linguistic root (‘economy’ and
‘economic’ both become ‘economi’). The second input is a number of topics that the
algorithm should form; we use a 15-topic model.
The are two broadly defined outputs. The algorithm will form, in our case, 15 topics
which are probability distributions over words and tell the user the words which tend to
go together. The algorithm also forms document distributions which contain probabilities
that capture the fraction of words policy makers devote to the different topics in their
communications. For example, it might suggest that a sentence in a statement (our level
of LDA analysis) is 0.75 about topic A and 0.2 about topic B and so on.6
To get more precise, topic models estimate K topics each of which is a distribution
βk ∈ ∆V over the V unique tokens (words) in the corpus vocabulary. LDA is flexible
enough to allow unique tokens to belong to more than one topic. LDA will also generate
a predictive distribution over topics θ̂d ∈ ∆K for each document, where ∆K is the K-
simplex. However, given that we estimate the topic model at the sentence level, rather
than use the predictive distribution, we prefer to work with the word to topic allocations
directly (this is an intermediate step in the LDA algorithm to generate θ̂d). In particular,
let φp,k,d = np,d(k)/np,d be the fraction of sentence p words allocated to topic k, where
np,d(k) is the number of sentence p words allocated to topic k, and np,d is the total number
of words in the paragraph. We will define a sentence as being about topic k when this
estimated topic allocation fraction φp,k,d is greater than some critical proportion (α).
In fact, we estimate the LDA model using a collapsed Gibbs sampling algorithm. As
such, we get measures of topic allocation for every iteration of the chain. The data that
we work with has been extracted from the best-performing (in an information matching
sense) chain but we draw 20 samples from points in the chain that are thinned using a
thinning interval of 50. We then take an average over the 20 samples.
We estimate our 15-topic LDA on the full corpus of 142 FOMC decision statements,
split into sentences, up to March 2015 (although we will estimate our FAVAR on a
slightly shorter sample of the data between 1998 and 2014). The LDA-estimated topics
cover different aspects of the FOMC communication. We select five topics which relate to
the discussion of the economic situation. The key words (tokens) in the economic topics
are presented as word clouds in figure 2:7
Topic 2: A topic which focuses on inflation and prices.
Topic 14: Another topic concerning inflation and prices.
Topic 4: A topic covering the demand side of the economic outlook.
6Once estimated at a given level of aggregation, it is possible to aggregate document distributions up
using a process called querying. See Hansen, McMahon, and Prat (2014) for details.
7Note that the figure plots the stemmed tokens as these are the unit of LDA analysis.
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Topic 6: A topic about the labour market issues.
Topic 9: A topic covering the prospects for growth.
3.2 Measuring tone with dictionary methods
Once we identify those sentences that are about the economic situation topics, we using
only these relevant sentences to create our time-series balance measure of the FOMC
statement on the economic situation using dictionary methods, or more simply, word
counting. This is a common way of measuring market sentiment in the finance literature,
where word lists are chosen to reflect positive and negative tone and applied to media text
or company results releases; see, for example, Tetlock (2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky,
and Macskassy (2008), Loughran and McDonald (2011) and Loughran and McDonald
(2014).
The idea is as follows. Let ` = (t1, . . . , tN) be a list of unique terms and d be a
document, which we can also think of as a list of (possibly non-unique) terms. We can
then define nd(`) to be the raw count of terms in ` in document d, and either use this
alone to index d, or else apply some normalization (like dividing by the total number
of terms in d). Our approach to combining the tone and topic algorithms is to view a
document as an ordered sequence of sentences d = (pi1,d, . . . , piΠd,d) where Πd is the total
number of sentences in document d. We identify the sentences in which topic k makes up
at least α fraction of attention as measured by φp,k,d allocation variable defined earlier.
Then, within this set of sentences, compute the fraction of words that lies in list ` and
normalise by the total number of words in sentences.
To measure the tone of the sentences on the economic situation, we use “directional”
word lists measuring words associated with expansion and contraction as used in Apel
and Blix Grimaldi (2012). For example, in table 1 we list some of the words that we
associate with contraction and expansion.8 Of course, these methods work best at finer
and finer levels of topic disagregation. Increasing risk is not typically a sign of economic
expansion but by isolating topics related to the economy, we hopefully have (at least
partly) corrected for this.
Using those sentences about the economic situation, we create our time-series balance
measure of the FOMC statement on the economic situation as follows:
EcSitt =
nPos,t − nNeg,d
TotalWordsECt
(2)
8The appendix contains the full list of words that we use in the analysis in this paper along with their
frequency of occurence. This list does not include words which we looked for but which were not found
in the FOMC statements.
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(a) Topic 2 (b) Topic 14
(c) Topic 4 (d) Topic 6
(e) Topic 9
Figure 2: Topics Covering FOMC views of the Economic Situation
Notes: These figures show estimated topics using LDA. Topic distributions are represented
as word clouds to facilitate visual inspection.
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Table 1: Example of Contraction and Expansion Words
Contraction Expansion
decreas* increas*
decelerat* accelerat*
slow* fast*
weak* strong*
low* high*
loss* gain*
contract* expand*
Notes: * indicates that any word ending is acceptable.
where nPos,t(nNeg,t) is the number of posive (negative) words in those sentences about the
economy, and TotalWordsECt is the total number of words about the economic situation.
9
This gives a balance measure which can be greater than zero (more words associated with
expansion) or less than zero (more contraction words).
For example, consider the following line on the economy from the January 2010 State-
ment:
“Household spending is expanding at a moderate rate but remains con-
strained by a weak labor market, modest income growth, lower housing wealth,
and tight credit.”
This sentence is about topic 4 and it contains 18 words, of which one is expansionary
(expanding) and three are contraction words (lower, moderate, weak). On its own, it
would get a balance score of −2
18
. But, in fact, we aggregate all the lines about the
economy from that statement and create the balance on the aggregated text which in
this case yields an overall negative balance (-0.07). We repeat this excercise is completed
for every statement, conducting the analysis on statements about one of the economic
topics.
Figure 3 shows the constructed index as bars (with each bar representing an FOMC
statement after a meeting). As can be seen there are breaks in the monthly time-series
of these contructed indices that affect the use of the series as a monthly time-series. This
is because in some months there is no FOMC meeting and as such there is no time-series
for that month. In these cases, we simply use value of the statement in the last meeting.
If there was a statement but no mention of the economic situation, as occurred in the
mid-1990s, the value of the index would be zero.
9Of course, it is possible to think at an even greater level of disaggregation, such as trying to measure
the extent to which the statement reveals new information about the labour market, or price develop-
ments, but we leave that for future research.
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Figure 3: EcSitt: Statement by statment and monthly index
Notes: This figure shows the overall balance of the FOMC statements about the economic
situation.
4 Dimension 3: Forward Guidance
The basic idea of forward guidance that we wish to capture is communication after
meeting t that captures the forward looking views of the committee as to how they
see interest rate decisions in future meetings. One issue is the extent to which any
forward guidance is Delphic or Odyssean as described by Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and
Justiniano (2012). The distinction, related to the Greek classical stories, is whether the
FOMC provides information about their view of the future (‘Delphic’) or whether they
commit themselves to a future path of interest rates (‘Odyssean’). Such a distinction,
and how one interpets FOMC forward guidance, is not uncontroversial as the Brookings
meeting discussion of the Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012) paper makes
clear. In this paper, we will not get a distinction that is perfectly Delphic or Odyssean.
Rather we shall measure the direction of guidance, the amount of guidance given and the
certainty in their statements about expected future path of interest rates. We shall not
distinguish between whether this is because they are committing to a particular path in
the Odyssean sense, they are signalling a forecast of the future direction of changes in
the economic outlook (Meyer 2012), or whether they think that other objectives, beyond
their usual ones, are driving likely decisions more (Romer 2012).
4.1 Manually Identifying Statements about Forward Guidance
In order to identify the relevant paragraphs in each statement, we use the narrative
approach. Specifically we employ a research assistant, guided by the list in Campbell,
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Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012), to select the statements related to discussions of
future decisions. The forward guidance paragraphs capture conditional statements about
the extent of monetary support going forward, the date-based guidance of the FOMC in
recent recent years, and also FOMC statements about the balance of risks as seen by the
FOMC.
As an example of the first kind, we capture statements such as from December 2013:
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the
Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary
policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program
ends and the economic recovery strengthens.”
For the second type, we capture statements such as that of June 2012: “To support
a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate
most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly
accommodative stance for monetary policy. In particular, the Committee decided today
to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently
anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a
subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally
low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.”
For the last type, the August 1999 statement contains an example: “Today’s increase
in the federal funds rate, together with the policy action in June and the firming of
conditions more generally in U.S. financial markets over recent months, should markedly
diminish the risk of rising inflation going forward. As a consequence, the directive the
Federal Open Market Committee adopted is symmetrical with regard to the outlook for
policy over the near term.”
In this sense we are slightly broader than the typical research design that assumes
that August 2003 was the first use of forward guidance. In particular, that statement
pointed out:
“The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the at-
tainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal.
In contrast, the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome fall in inflation
exceeds that of a rise in inflation from its already low level. The Commit-
tee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low
is likely to be the predominant concern for the foreseeable future. In these
circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be
maintained for a considerable period.”
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4.2 Measuring Amount, Direction and Certainty of Guidance
In deciding how to measure the extent of forward guidance, one clear thing is that if there
are no words about future interest rates, there is no forward guidance. The other thing
that should be clear is that guidance can, as it typically is, suggest more expansionary
policy or, much more rarely, likely contractionary policy.10 Finally, there are occasions
when the guidance is more clear cut, and others when the FOMC is more cautious in its
guidance.
Once the forward guidance paragraphs have been identified manually, it is trivial to
determine the direction of guidance. In particular, as we plot for each of the statement
dates in Figure 4a, we classify a statement about more expansionary monetary policy as
−1, a neutral stratement as 0 and a statement about contractionary monetary policy as
+1.
To measure the amount of guidance given we could choose between measuring the
number of words dedicated to the paragraphs about forward guidance, or we could nor-
malise this measure relative to the whole statement (measuring the share of the statement
dedicated to forward guidance. Given the trend increase in the length of statements, we
choose to measure the amount of guidance using the latter share measure.11 This is plot-
ted in Figure 4b and shows the committee provided most quantity of guidance around
2009 and then from the middle of 2012.
Finally, in order to measure how ‘certain’, as opposed to cautious, the FOMC is in
their statement about forward guidance, we return to using dictionary methods described
above. For this we use the ‘ambiguity’ word list developed by Loughran and McDonald
(2011) and augment it with some words used specifically to convey certainty or uncer-
tainty in monetary policy. To measure this aspect of the paragraph, we use:
Uncertaintyt =
nUncertainty,t
nFGt
(3)
where nUncertainty,t is the number of uncertain words used in the paragraphs about forward
guidance at time t, and nFGt is the total number of words about forward guidance at time
t.12
10The May 2006 statement is an example: “The Committee judges that some further policy firming
may yet be needed to address inflation risks but emphasizes that the extent and timing of any such firming
will depend importantly on the evolution of the economic outlook as implied by incoming information.
In any event, the Committee will respond to changes in economic prospects as needed to support the
attainment of its objectives.”
11However, the overall indexed (once normalised) is almost identical whichever of the measures we
choose. This is shown in Figure 5.
12As an alternative, we could use the certainty/uncertainty measure as a signal for the variance of
future monetary policy shocks along the lines of Akkaya (2015). We leave this for future research.
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Figure 4: Components of FG index
Notes: These figures show, for each FOMC statement released since January 1998, the
direction, amount and ambiguity of forward guidance (if any). These components are
combined to yield the overall FGt index as described in the text.
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4.3 The Overall FGt Index
Our overall index of forward guidance is then a combination of the three forward guidance
measures as follows:
FGt =
ShareFGt ×DirectionFGt
Uncertaintyt
. (4)
We normalise this measure such the largest negative value (the instance of the largest,
relatively certain, expansionary forward guidance statement) is given by -1. Figure 5
shows the constructed index both as bars (representing an FOMC statement) and as
the monthly series in which we fill in the gaps according the last statement. This index
picks up nicely that, since late 2008, the FOMC have used their strongest ever forward
guidance suggesting expansionary monetary policy. The index actually hits its lowest
point at the end of 2012 when the Fed retain the ‘considerable time’ phrase in their
expectations about continued easing monetary policy, but they also add more discussion
about the bond-buying program and the fact that interest rates will remain near zero for
a considerable amount of time after the conclusion of the bond-buying programme.
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Notes: This figure shows the overall FGt index as described in the text.
5 Econometric Methodology: FAVAR Analysis
In order to investigate the effects of the extra dimensions of the monetary policy announce-
ments that we measure using the two time-series indices, we use a Factor-Augmented Vec-
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tor Autoregression model (FAVAR). The FAVAR model is essentially a dynamic factor
model in which some factors are observable and we are interested in identification of struc-
tural disturbances (rather than simply forecasting) (Stock and Watson 2005). FAVAR
analysis can be implemented in different ways including Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz
(2005), the approach we follow most closely, Stock and Watson (2005), and Marcellino,
Favero, and Neglia (2005). It is made up of:
Driving Variables Yt: M observed variables (each from t = 0, 1, ..., T ) which are as-
sumed to drive the economy. These variables can also be thought of as observable factors
in a dynamic factor model.
Unobserved factors Ft: K factors which capture the evolution of unobserved state
variables which drive the economy.
Observed economic time series Xt: N time-series which we are interested in under-
standing the evolution of in reaction to shocks.
The structure of the relationships between these variables is given by:[
Ft
Yt
]
= Φ(L)
[
Ft−1
Yt−1
]
+ vt (5)
where
Xt = Λ
FFt + Λ
Y Yt + et (6)
where equation (6) is called the ‘observation equation’ and it tells us that Ft and Yt
are the driving forces of the observed economic time series, and equation (5) is called
the ‘transition equation’.13 This framework would be a standard VAR if we omit Ft
and instead include important time-series in Yt. However, if we have omitted important
information then our VAR estimates are biased and can lead to very misleading results.
The classic price puzzle is an example of this. The FAVAR approach allows us to include
(and look at the reaction of) a large number of variables without running into the curse
of dimensionality.
In the original baseline FAVAR model of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005), only the
Fed Funds Target rate is included as a driving variable affecting the economy (Yt = [it]).
Moreover, there is a single factor (K = 1).14
We have three dimensions of the monetary policy announcements - the description
of the economic situation (EcSitt), the current stance (st) and the forward guidance
13Here it is written as order 1 (1 lag) but any order p version can be written as a VAR(1) using the
‘companion form’.
14One issue with the standard FAVAR approach is that it is not possible to impose that some factors
can react to the policy shocks because the factors have no labels. Belviso and Milani (2006) estimate
a ‘structural FAVAR’ in which they group various indicators together and extract factors from those
groups separately which allows them to assign economic meaning to the estimated factors.
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(FGt). We will estimate our multi-dimensional monetary policy FAVAR using four factors
(K = 4) and the three measures included in the Yt vector:
Yt =
 EcSittst
FGt
 . (7)
5.1 Steps in the estimation of the FAVAR model
We estimate the FAVAR defined by equations (5) and (6) using the two-step approach
that uses principle components to estimate the factors:
1. estimate the factors using principal components - Fˆt.
2. estimate the VAR in Fˆt and Yt.
As there are identification assumptions made in both steps, we shall now be more precise
on these two steps. As our approach follows closely the approach of Bernanke, Boivin,
and Eliasz (2005), readers familiar with FAVAR analysis can skip to section 5.2 which
outlines the identification approach specific to this paper.
5.1.1 Step 1: Estimation of Fˆt
We extract the first K + M (number of factors plus number of Yt variables) principal
components of Xt which is called Cˆ(Ft, Yt). These are linear combinations of Ft and Yt.
We are interested in identifying the structural shocks to all of the Yt variables but we
cannot identify the shocks if the estimated factors include the effects of Yt. Essentially,
the problem is that the approach to estimating the principal components does not account
for the fact that Yt is observed. Therefore we need to purge the Cˆ(Ft, Yt) of the effects
of the Yt variables that we are interested in shocking.
We follow the identification approach of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) that has
also been used many by others since:
Identification Assumption 1 A subset of Xt do not react contemporaneously to shocks
to Yt; we call these ‘slow-moving variables’. We can therefore use the principal compo-
nents across these variables to identify the Fˆt to use in the FAVAR.
Precisely, we:
1. estimate the principal components in the slow-moving Xt variables and call these
Cˆ∗(Ft); under the identification assumption 1 these principal components do not
contain reaction to Yt.
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2. regress
Cˆ(Ft, Yt) = βcCˆ
∗(Ft) + βyYt + ηt (8)
3. Define:
Fˆt = Cˆ(Ft, Yt)− βyYt (9)
Equation (8) is estimated using standard OLS but with principal components as
regression variables. Given that the factors we extract are potentially subject to sampling
error (Koop and Korobilis 2010), consistent estimation of (8) is not guaranteed. In fact,
consistency of factor-augmented regressions is the subject of a large literature such as Bai
and Ng (2006) and Forni, Giannone, Lippi, and Reichlin (2009). The former paper shows
that two-step factor-augmented regressions can be consistently estimated if
√
T/N → 0.
The main advantage of approximating the factors using principal components is that
the method is tractable even when the dimensionality of the FAVAR increases. An
alternative is to move to sampling the factors and estimating the FAVAR jointly using
Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. As Koop and Korobilis (2010) explain,
the advantage is that MCMC estimates eliminates sampling error, but MCMC estimation
is less tractable. As it is a commonly applied technique, we proceed to use the two-step
principal components method of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) while noting the
potential caveats.
5.1.2 Step 2: Estimation of a VAR in Fˆt and Yt
We then estimate a standard Bayesian VAR using code described in Koop and Korobilis
(2009) and Koop and Korobilis (2010). Define:
Zt =
[
Fˆt
Yt
]
(10)
Then (5) becomes our reduced form (estimated) model:
Zt = AZt−1 + vt (11)
with vt the reduced-form residuals satisfying E
[
vtv
′
t
]
= Ω. This estimation gives us Aˆ
and Ωˆ.15
15The parameters are sampled treating the estimated factors as if they were observed data (Koop and
Korobilis 2010).
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If we consider that there is a true structural model of the economy in which:
HZt = BZt−1 + ut (12)
where ut are the structural shocks we are interested in and the structural variance-
covariance matrix (VCM) is given by E
[
utu
′
t
]
= D.
We can map the reduced form estimates to the strutural model using:
Zt = H
−1BZt−1 +H−1ut (13)
and noting that Aˆ = H−1B, vˆ = H−1ut and, the key for identification as it is the
only equation linking observables and structural coefficients, Ωˆ = E
[
H−1utut
′
H−1
′]
=
H−1DH−1
′
. To map the estimated VCM of the residuals to H−1 we need restrictions on
the coefficients in D and H−1; Ωˆ only provides N
2+N
2
unique values (since symmetric).
Identification Assumption 2 We identify the H−1 matrix from the Ωˆ estimates by
restricting the coefficients of structural VCM (D = IN), as well as assuming that H
−1 is
lower triangular (Choleski indentification).
The first part of identification assumption 2, assuming the structural shocks are inde-
pendent from one another and also normalisation of the variance of the structural shocks
to 1, provides all but N
2−N
2
restrictions on H−1. Assuming that H−1 is lower triangular,
then we get N
2−N
2
zero restrictions. This Choleski identification amounts to ordering re-
strictions: a lower triangular H−1 says that the reduced form residual for the first ordered
variable depends only on its own structural shock, the second variable depends on its own
shock and the shock to the first variable, and so on for each variable.
The ordering of the variables in (7) means that, in addition to lagged endogenous
variables, the FOMC’s views on the economic situation respond contemporaneously to
shocks to the macroeconomic factors (not separately identfied) as well as to any of its
own shocks. This means that the EcSitt shocks that we identify capture when the FOMC
view of the economic situation (measured by our index) is out of line with the prediction
that others looking at aggregate macro data would come up with (on average).
Ordering st second in (7) means that the current stance of monetary policy reacts to
lagged endogenous variables, the current period shocks to the factors, as well as any EcSitt
shocks. These terms capture the variation in economic conditions typically captured by
individual macroeconomic time series such as the inflation gap and the output gap. The
remaining variation in st is explained by monetary stance shocks. In other words, the
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implied monetary policy rule in the empirical model (assuming a single lag) is given by:
st = ρsst−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lagged s
+φ1Fˆt−1 + φ2Fˆt + φ3EcSitt−1 + φ4
EcSit
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ×Γt
+ ηFGt−1 + st︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deviations incl. signalled
(14)
The ordering means that shocks to FGt do not contemporaneously affect the monetary
stance. This is consistent with the idea that forward guidance signals expected deviations
from the normal rule. As such, some of the deviation in period t is not a surprise but has
been signalled in the past with forward guidance. Ordered last, the amount of forward
guidance (FGt) depends on the lags of the factors and all other endgoneous variables,
and it can react to the shocks to all the other variables in the FAVAR.
5.2 Using the framework to measure the impact of statements
We estimate our FAVAR with monthly data. The sample period used is January 1998
to December 2014. We start in 1998 in order to concentrate on a period in which the
FOMC made statements after all their meetings. This is also the start of the period
during which the FOMC was more likely to both describe the economic situation as well
give some guidance on the expected future path of interest rates. We end in December
2014. This means that the total time series dimension is 204 monthly observations.
We include four factors estimated using principle components on the Xt time-series
data. Our Xt matrix of time-series variables contains 76 variables. Appendix A presents
the list of time-series data used, the sources as well as how we transform the data. As
required by identification 1, we need to define which variables react contemporaneously
with policy changes and which are ‘slow-moving’. The appendix provides the full list,
but broadly we consider markets data to be fast-moving and most macro variables to be
slow-moving.
We estimate the FAVAR using Gibbs Sampling with 20,000 draws sampled after a
burn-in of 10,000 draws and then we thin the 20,000 draws down to 400 draws by keeping
only every 50th sample along the chain. The confidence bands provided with estimates
are derived using the estimated distribution of 400 draws. The analysis presented below
is for a FAVAR estimated with seven lags (monthly data) and with three factors included,
using the sample from January 1998 to December 2014. The results are similar if we use
two or four factors, and also if we use 4 lags or 13 lags.
6 Results
First we examine the effect of shocks to the FOMC’s monetary stance using analysis
of impulse response functions (IRF). Unlike traditional monetary policy shocks papers,
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we then shift our attention to the statement effects in terms of forward guidance (FGt)
and shocks to the assessment of the economic situation (EcSitt). After the impulse
response analysis, we examine the contribution of these shocks to the variance of US
macroeconomic data.
6.1 The effect of a change in FOMC monetary stance
We here examine the effects of traditional monetary policy shocks, namely those arising
from shocks to the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and, at the ZLB, asset purchase shocks.
Figures 6 to 9 present the impulse responses to such a shock. Although this is the
standard type of monetary policy shock, it is worth noting that our inclusion of two
additional policy variables may capture some of the effects that would typically be part
of the monetary policy shock. For example, if on a given date the Fed has a more positive
view of the economy than the (lagged) data suggests, this might be typically captured
as a deviation from the normal monetary policy rule (a monetary shock) whereas in our
framework this is captured by the EcSitt index.
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Figure 6: IRF Response to Monetary Stance (st) shock: Policy Variable Reaction
Figure 6 presents the shock that we analyse. Perhaps due to the period that we
estimate (1998-2014), the shock is quite persistent. This is partly as a result of being
directly persistent, but also because expansionary policy is found to typically lead to
expansionary forward guidance which itself pushes down on the monetary stance.
The result is that market yields in a number of fixed income markets are pushed down
persistently and across the yield curve (Figure 7). shows that the effect of this shock on
21
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Figure 7: IRF Response to a Monetary Stance (st) shock: Yields Reaction
market rates is to raise rates across the yield curve. The effect is greatest at the shorter
end of the yield curve such that the yield curve twists down. Corporate yields also fall.
The reaction of many of the market variables is imprecisely estimated (figure 8). A
decrease in the monetary stance tends, with a lag, to increase confidence, and reduce
measures of uncertainty and volatility. It also pushes up on equity prices but this effect
is very imprecisely estimated.
The effect on real variables is also somewhat imprecisely estimated. Figure 9 shows
the responses. Nonetheless, the effect of a monetary easing is to lower unemployment
and prices (e.g. CPI) and to push up on measures of economic activity. These effects
tend to take around 18 months to take effect.
6.2 The effect of a change in Forward Guidance
We next look at the response of a change to the forward guidance element of the FOMC
statement FGt. The shock, shown in 10, involves the FOMC communicating an expan-
sionary stance about the future decisions on interest rates; a negative shock is, in our
interpretation, more forward guidance.
The shock has the desired effect on market rates as shown in figure 10. As might
be expeected given the typical deployment of forward guidance at a time when short-
term rates are historically low, there is little near-term effect on shorter maturity bonds.
However, more expansionary forward guidance about future rates tends to decrease longer
maturity bonds significantly. It also plays a role in driving corporate bond yields including
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Figure 8: IRF Response to Monetary Stance (st) shock: Markets Reaction
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Figure 9: IRF Response to Monetary Stance (st) shock: Real Variables Reaction
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Figure 10: IRF Response to FGt shock: Policy Variable Reaction
in the near term after the statement.
These results seem longer lived than the findings of Wright (2012). He uses a daily
VAR and identifies monetary policy shocks under QE using heteroskedasticity (partic-
ularly that monetary policy shocks are relatively more volatile around U.S. monetary
policy announcements.) He finds that expansionary monetary policy shocks boost asset
prices but that the effects are not long-lived. A main difference is that we have tried to
isolate the effects of specific aspects of communication.
The shocks to forward guidance also affect market variables in the expected way.
The impulse responses of a selection of markets variables is presented in 12. For exam-
ple, equity is estimated to respond positively to more certainty about future monetary
expansion (though imprecisely estimated). The dollar tends to depreciate with the news.
However, the effects on real variables are much less clear cut and much noisier (figure
13). More expansionary forward guidance would, with a lag, start to push activity and
labour market variables in the expected (or hoped) direction. But the evidence of a clear
effect on real activity is difficult to gauge.
6.3 The effect of a change in Economic Situation Balance
For our final analysis of impulse responses, we turn to the effects of a shock to EcSitt. A
negative shock is equivalent to the FOMC statement talking more about economic con-
traction in their post-meeting statement. Figure 14 presents the shock, and the response
of the other policy variables, while figures 16 to 17 present the response of the other
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Figure 11: IRF Response to FGt shock: Yields Reaction
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Figure 12: IRF Response to FGt shock: Markets Reaction
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Figure 13: IRF Response to FGt shock: Real Variables Reaction
variables we have analysed before.
There is almost no significant reaction of yields (figure 15), markets variables (16)
nor real variables.Some of the impulse responses seem to be intuitive, such as corporate
bond yields falling, while others seem unintuitive, such as purchasing managers’ survey
responses indicating more activity about 6 months after the statement. This is despite
being ordered first of the monetary policy variables. It seems that the FOMC shocks that
reveal the current economic situation do not affect the variables in the way that FOMC
guidance about their future policy. Perhaps this is because the markets react more to
other, more quantitative, information released by the FOMC or that they update their
views of the economy in a similar way to the FOMC in response to economic releases
such that there is little news in the FOMC view about the economy, but only news in
how the FOMC intends to react to it (captured more by FGt).
6.4 Analysis of the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
In order to understand how important each of these dimensions of monetary policy and
communication is, we turn to the analysis of Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
(FEVD) from the FAVAR system. This is, like the impulse response functions, derived
from the structural VMA representation. Specficially, it looks at the variance in the h
period ahead forecast error that can be attributed to each shock. Hence, we can use
the FEVD to quantify how important different shocks are for each variable at different
horizons.
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Figure 14: IRF Response to EcSitt shock: Policy Variable Reaction
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Figure 15: IRF Response to EcSitt shock: Yields Reaction
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Figure 16: IRF Response to EcSitt shock: Markets Reaction
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Figure 17: IRF Response to EcSitt shock: Real Variables Reaction
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Table 2: FEVD: Yields
Variance Decomposition Share of Monetary Shock
Horizon Stance EcSit FG Total Stance EcSit FG
3m Treasury Yield
1M 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.99 0.00 0.01
6M 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.98 0.00 0.02
12M 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.97 0.00 0.03
60M 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.37 0.90 0.01 0.09
1yr Treasury Yield
1M 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.40 0.98 0.00 0.01
6M 0.46 0.00 0.01 0.47 0.98 0.00 0.02
12M 0.44 0.00 0.02 0.46 0.96 0.00 0.03
60M 0.34 0.00 0.03 0.37 0.90 0.01 0.09
3yr Treasury Yield
1M 0.41 0.00 0.04 0.45 0.90 0.01 0.10
6M 0.46 0.00 0.03 0.49 0.94 0.00 0.06
12M 0.43 0.00 0.03 0.46 0.93 0.01 0.06
60M 0.33 0.00 0.04 0.37 0.89 0.01 0.09
5yr Treasury Yield
1M 0.40 0.00 0.13 0.53 0.75 0.01 0.25
6M 0.44 0.00 0.06 0.51 0.88 0.01 0.12
12M 0.41 0.00 0.05 0.46 0.89 0.01 0.10
60M 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.37 0.87 0.01 0.12
10yr Treasury Yield
1M 0.46 0.01 0.25 0.72 0.64 0.01 0.35
6M 0.46 0.01 0.10 0.56 0.82 0.01 0.17
12M 0.43 0.00 0.07 0.51 0.85 0.01 0.15
60M 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.38 0.85 0.01 0.13
Notes: The columns on the left shows the fraction of the variance of the forecast error at
each horizon explained by the shocks to each of the three monetary policy dimensions. The
column ‘Total’ shows the sum of these fractions across the monetary policy dimensions. The
columns on the right simply shows the relative contribution of a given monetary dimension
to the overall variance explained by the three dimensions of monetary policy together.
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Table 3: FEVD: Markets
Variance Decomposition Share of Monetary Shock
Horizon Stance EcSit FG Total Stance EcSit FG
VIX
1M 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.69 0.01 0.29
6M 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.75 0.05 0.20
12M 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.18
60M 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.87 0.02 0.11
S&P 500
1M 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.76 0.06 0.18
6M 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.75 0.06 0.19
12M 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.78 0.05 0.17
60M 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.81 0.03 0.15
NASDAQ
1M 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.82 0.04 0.14
6M 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.17
12M 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.77 0.05 0.18
60M 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.81 0.03 0.16
Wilson Eq Index
1M 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.75 0.06 0.20
6M 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.74 0.05 0.20
12M 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.77 0.05 0.19
60M 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.81 0.03 0.16
USD TWI Major
1M 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.90 0.02 0.08
6M 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.81 0.04 0.16
12M 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.83 0.04 0.13
60M 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.89 0.02 0.09
Notes: The columns on the left shows the fraction of the variance of the forecast error at
each horizon explained by the shocks to each of the three monetary policy dimensions. The
column ‘Total’ shows the sum of these fractions across the monetary policy dimensions. The
columns on the right simply shows the relative contribution of a given monetary dimension
to the overall variance explained by the three dimensions of monetary policy together.
Tables 2 - 4 show the FEVD explained by monetary shocks for a selection of rates,
market variables and real variables. These are shown for one month (1M), six months
(6M), one year (12M) and five year (60M) forecast horizons. The rows show, respectively,
the response of yields and spreads, other financial market variables, and the response of a
selection of real variables. The fraction of the variance of the forecast error at each horizon
explained by the shocks to each of the three monetary policy dimensions. The column
‘Total’ shows the sum of these fractions across the monetary policy dimensions. The
second set of columns focus only on the relative contribution of each of the dimensions
of FOMC decisions and communication to the total contribution from monetary sources.
The contribution of all dimensions of monetary policy to the forecast error variance
of the selected variables ranges between around 65% for 10 year yields at the one month
horizon, to below 5% for some of the real economic variables at the one month horizon.
As might be expected, as we move to longer forecast horizons, the role of the monetary
dimensions tends to grow for real variables (up to around 30% for some variables) while
the role in explaining yields tends to decline. Of course, at longer horizons it is other
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Table 4: FEVD: Real Variables
Variance Decomposition Share of Monetary Shock
Horizon Stance EcSit FG Total Stance EcSit FG
Capacity Utilisation
1M 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.74 0.03 0.23
6M 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.71 0.04 0.25
12M 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.69 0.04 0.26
60M 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.34 0.91 0.01 0.08
ISM Man Employment
1M 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.77 0.11 0.13
6M 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.75 0.13 0.12
12M 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.77 0.09 0.14
60M 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.85 0.02 0.12
ISM Non-Man Emp
1M 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.91 0.05 0.05
6M 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.79 0.09 0.11
12M 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.79 0.07 0.14
60M 0.28 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.90 0.01 0.08
Unemployment
1M 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.49 0.01 0.51
6M 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.46 0.01 0.52
12M 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.50 0.02 0.48
60M 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.88 0.01 0.11
CPI
1M 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.93 0.02 0.05
6M 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.81 0.05 0.14
12M 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.84 0.04 0.12
60M 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.86 0.03 0.11
Notes: The columns on the left shows the fraction of the variance of the forecast error at
each horizon explained by the shocks to each of the three monetary policy dimensions. The
column ‘Total’ shows the sum of these fractions across the monetary policy dimensions. The
columns on the right simply shows the relative contribution of a given monetary dimension
to the overall variance explained by the three dimensions of monetary policy together.
shocks (not studied here) which explain the variance of most variables. This is in line
with previous VAR and FAVAR studies such as Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).
In terms of the relative importance of the three dimensions that we study, the most
important dimension of monetary policy remains the current monetary stance accounting
for at least 50% of the total monetary contribution, and typcially 60-70%. In terms of
the novel dimensions studied in this paper, the results reinforce the earlier IRF results.
Namely, shocks to FGt seem to explain the movement of yields data, especially at longer
maturities and at shorter forecast horizons, but they explain only a small portion of the
shocks to market data and real variables. In all cases, the shocks to EcSitt explain a
smaller amount of the variability in the variables.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we empirically explore the channels through which central bank commu-
nication has effects. Moreover, we have tried to ascertain whether the effects of FOMC
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communication on markets is persistent and whether there are effects on real variables.
Using tools from computational linguistics, we have measured two important character-
istics of FOMC statements and found that, at least in the last 18 years in the US, the
central bank guidance on future interest rates seems to have been more important than
their communication of economic conditions. Nonetheless, neither communication has
particularly strong effects on real economic variables in our FAVAR.
A number of extensions of this paper are warranted in future work. The first is to
extend the analysis to other forms of FOMC communication; perhaps speeches and other
communications such as the FOMC meeting minutes might contain information that
investors learn from and that affects economic outcomes. Second, it would useful to see
if there is a time-varying role of the effects of central bank communication. In particular,
the effects of central bank communication may change when interest rates hit the zero
lower bound. Third, it could be that there are interactions between monetary stance and
communication. Perhaps the stance is only found to have a strong role because of the
communication that has gone with it. Finally, it would be useful to extend the analysis
to other countries and thereby see if communication plays a similar role. For example,
there is a longer history of forward guidance in Sweden which would be useful to analyse.
We leave these for future work.
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Table A.2: Word lists and frequency across FOMC statements in sample
Expansion words Contraction words Ambiguity Words in Sample
Stemmed Token Frequency Stemmed Token Frequency Stemmed Token Frequency
improv 55 moder 82 condit 91
foster 52 slow 35 anticip 71
increas 42 low 33 believ 20
expand 38 weak 27 risk 14
rise 27 subdu 20 may 14
higher 14 lower 20 appear 11
risen 10 fall 13 conting 9
gain 9 slower 5 suggest 9
strong 5 weaker 3 seem 7
acceler 1 decreas 3 somewhat 4
faster 1 weaken 2 uncertainti 4
strength 1 contract 2 uncertain 3
soften 2 possibl 2
deceler 1 destabil 2
cool 1 volatil 1
tent 1
unusu 1
might 1
alter 1
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